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Abstract 
The present paper is concerned with the issue of local leadership in the countries of East-Central Europe. Concretely, it 
constitutes an attempt at examining the outlook, i.e. the profile and the role, of the local political elites in East-Central Europe, 
with a special emphasis on small-to-medium sized communities. The main argument put forward is that the disparities in the 
outlook and priorities of the local political elites are to be explained through a combination between the different inheritance of 
the communist ancien régime, at the level of “elite political culture” (Kowitt 1990) and the present challenges imposed by 
various degrees of decentralization. For the purpose of exemplifying the inquiry into the local political elites of the region and for 
further exploring the topic on the two dimensions, the paper employs the comparative approach of “quality-based profile” 
(Prewitt, 1970) constructed by the members of the Municipal Councils in Tecuci (Romania), Česká Lípa (the Czech Republic), 
Oleśnica (Poland), and Targovishte (Bulgaria). Hence, the study uses five models of the “ideal portrait” of the local councilor: 
ethical, pragmatic, technocratic, political, and gender. According to the results of a study applying a standard written 
questionnaire among the local councilors of the three communities in the period December 2010-February 2013, the paper 
distinguishes among three corresponding types of local elites: (1) “predominantly elitistic”, (2) “democratic elitist”, and (3) 
“predominantly democratic”, following two types of explanation accounting for the differences among the four cases: the legacy 
of the defunct regime and the degree of administrative decentralization. 
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1. Theoretical assessments. On the study of local political elites 
The literature dedicated to the study of local political elites is impressively reduced: the bulk of this literature 
derives from the broad study of political elites and consequently dates from the 1970s, once with the climax reached 
by the elitist empirical studies. In this respect, the most frequently quoted, the renowned oeuvre pertains to Robert 
Dahl who constructed its poliarchic model on the study of the municipality of New Haven. Among the most 
prominent studies on the slippery and feeble soil of local political elites, the mentionable titles are the pioneering 
works authored by Robert Staughton and Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown (1929) and Middletown in Transition 
(1937), undertaken in Muncie (Indiana). Despite the anthropological overload of their volumes, it is important to 
bear in mind that the two American scholars were among the first to endeavor in such an inductively-driven urban 
inquiry, and the first to consider the impact of economic changes and development strategies on various segments of 
the town’s population, including the leading strata of the community, on these segments’ values and behaviors. 
Lynds’ work is equally significant for it paves the way for Dahl’s future observations, stressing on the relevance of 
power – even in the very confined, narrow space of a small town – and on the place of economic notables in 
Muncie, the “businessmen”, on their conspicuous influence upon the political leadership of the town and on the 
entire activity and life of the urban community. From the prism of these conclusions, when discussing the 
“Middletown Studies”, Nelson Polsby (1963, p. 14) labels them as “Marxist” (for they contend that property among 
the means of production provides for absolute power within a municipality) and the representatives of the 
“stratification theory” in elitist studies, for they ultimately reach the conclusion that the local elite is the one that 
possess political power – usually springing from other form of power exerted at the local level, e.g. economical –, as 
an instrument for governing the community in accordance to its own vernacular interests. Illustrative for the cases 
selected here (particularly for the Romanian case), although they stress on the “net separation” between the 
economical institutions and the political ones, even at the local level, the Lynds do acknowledge the immanent 
interdependence between the two institutions and leadership, since “those that dominate from an economic 
standpoint the community exert their control on the political problems, as well, only to avoid the too accentuated 
increase in taxation or a too strong involvement in their own affairs [by the political leadership].Otherwise, they are 
totally disinterested in the political life.” (Lynds, 1937, p. 129) This assessment might appear yet too hazardous, 
taking into consideration the frequency and the intensity of interactions and network formation between the political 
and the economic elites; a series of tentative evaluations somehow antagonizing with Lynds’ conclusion are drawn 
from the present study, but, while the American study is focused on Muncie in the 1920s and 1930s, the present 
study is extremely contingent on four towns in East-Central Europe in 2010-2013, making hence opposite views and 
results virtually irreconcilable for the simple fact that the two studies are circumscribed to particular instances, 
settings and time frames, with no pretence to exhaustive generalizations. As a matter of fact, the Lynds’ studies on 
“Middletown” and their feeble conclusions in respect to the connections between economic and political elite at the 
local level (dominantly in urban areas) opened the way for similar, more mature and more meaningful empirical 
endeavors oriented towards the analysis of the said connections and of their impact on the developmental strategies 
and the general profile of the urban communities; notable in this sense is William Lloyd Warner’s study on “Yankee 
City” (Newburyport, Massachusetts) (Warner & Lunt, 1941; Warner & Lunt, 1942; Warner & Strole, 1945; Warner 
& Low, 1947; Warner, 1959; Warner, 1963), the hypothetical urban center dominated by entrepreneurs, 
businessmen, freelancers and liberal professionals, who managed to forge a sort of “class consciousness” and who 
virtually ousted any trace of autonomy from the political institutions. Surely, such a stance is too vehement and 
radical, since it implies the blunt reality that, at the local level, the economic elite is the one that ultimately governs 
in town. Notwithstanding his categorical positions, Warner and his work on “Yankee City” are to be kept in mind 
when endeavoring in the thin and narrow field of local political leadership at least from two perspectives: firstly, his 
observations are heavily utilized and partly confirmed – albeit in a nuanced form – by the present research, which 
point to the pertinence and contemporaneity thereof; secondly, he employs a singular method, that of an “index of 
evaluated participation” (i.e. the construction of a scale comprising the expertise’s evaluation of the “prestige” 
enjoyed by key-individuals within the community, and their placing on the social hierarchy), quite similar to 
Hunter’s method (presented below and further utilized, as well, in this study), which stresses and manages somehow 
to operationalize the concept of elite “prestige”. Soon after Warner’s “Yankee City” studies had known scholarly 
recognition, Floyd Hunter advanced a resembling work, conducted in “Regional City” (different researches in 
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Atlanta and Georgia) among the members of the local upper class (Hunter, Schaffer & Sheps, 1956). Hunter’s 
findings are strikingly similar to Warner’s: as in “Yankee City”, in “Regional City”, “the businessmen are the 
leaders of the community […], as they actually are in any town. The wealth, the social prestige and the political 
machinery are functional to the wielding of power by these leaders.” (Hunter, 1953, p. 81) In confronting dilemmas 
of “prestige” and “reputation” of local notables, Hunter contends that “their visual influence [and virtual 
recognition] is transformed into power”. Yet again, the study is diverged towards the economic portions of the 
ruling class, while the local political elite is completely overshadowed by the magnitude of the reputation the 
businessmen possess. The emphasis on the predominance and preeminence of the economic elite on local decision-
making and on its “caste” behavior are furthered in Delbert Miller’s inquiry into “Pacific City”, although this time 
the scholar minds about the political decision-makers, as well, mentioning their role as mere “counterbalance” for 
the interests of local big business (Miller, 1985, pp. 9-15, esp. pp. 13-15). If C. Wright Mills is central for the 
“positional method”, Warner and Hunter are exemplary for the “reputational method”, Robert Dahl’s Poliarchy and 
Who Governs ? (1961) are the referential works for the “decisional method” in analyzing elites: the research in New 
Haven (Connecticut) revealed that those who hold the political power are essentially that quite exclusive group of 
individuals who take a decision, i.e. who initiates a proposition and who subsequently validates or opposes it. 
Definitely, the scope of Dahl’s study is laudable, as his primary intention was to provide a rejoinder to both Marxist 
and elitist interpretations on local politics and to somehow “rehabilitate” the traditional image and model of the 
American democracy – even at the local level – as veritably democratic and integral, hence refuting Mills’s, 
Warner’s and Hunter’s “invitations” to perceiving national and local elites as some sort of complotistic and 
clandestine caste. Dahl’s elites are factionalist, fragmentary, placed in a continuous fight for the control over society 
(similar to the struggle between “lions” and “foxes” in Pareto’s accounts); it is their meeting and their subsequent 
negotiations in the decision-making process that actually matters in describing elites. Surely, these factional leaders 
and groups do agree on the very basis of the “rules of the democratic game” and on the accountability of the 
citizens, making “poliarchy” probably the best “approximation” of democracy. On the other hand, the observations 
drawn from the small town of New Haven conclude: the central position of the Mayor, who participates to decision-
making in all spheres of competence; the extreme specialization of the elite group; the absence of economic elites in 
the process of decision-making at the local level (with the partial exception of decisions taken in the sphere of urban 
development), etc. Notwithstanding the importance of and the central role played by these works in the general 
scholarly evolution of the local elite studies, quite unfortunately, few of them concentrated their attention on the 
composition of the Municipal Council as legislative centers of power at the local level, particularly within small-to-
medium sized communities. 
2. Theoretical and methodological framework: Explaining variations in local leadership in ECE 
The present study advances a threefold classification of local political leadership, constructed employing mainly 
two explanatory trajectories, one of the being discussed at some length here: (a) the level of administrative-fiscal 
decentralization specific for each of the countries under scrutiny, and (2) the “legacy” of the former communist 
regime, expressed through the type of “elite political culture” (Jowitt, 1999). For the level of administrative-fiscal 
decentralization, although the paper acknowledges the importance of various other forms of decentralization 
(vertical, decision-making, appointment, electoral, fiscal, personnel – Treisman, 2002; administrative v. political; 
territorial v. technical – Apostol Tofan, 2008; vertical v. horizontal; functional v. territorial – Stoica, 2003; internal v. 
external), it favors a rather reductionist approach on fiscal, expenditure-based decentralization. For this purpose, it 
employs the average indexes of decentralization currently utilized by the World Bank and the IMF in the issuing of 
their annual reports † , operationalizing “decentralization” as the subnational share of general government 
 
 
† Along a series of domains of considerable interest at the local level (infrastructure, education, healthcare, public security, transportation, 
social services (including housing and unemployment relief), cultural and recreational activities, etc.), it evaluates the extent to which they are 
dealt with nationally, regionally and locally. This evaluation is constructed primarily based on pieces of legislation, bylaws, internal regulations 
of different administrative and executive bodies, as well as on some empirical endeavors undertaken by the World Bank and the IMF expertise. 
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expenditure. In order to properly account for the differences in the level of fiscal-administrative decentralization 
among the four cases, this paper adds to these indexes three thresholds, thusly: (a) a significant level of 
administrative and fiscal decentralization describes the countries whose average subnational share of general 
expenditure is higher than 50%; (b) a standard level of decentralization is specific for those countries with an 
average local and regional share of general government expenditure is higher than 30%, but lower than 50%; and (c) 
a low level of decentralization characterizes the countries with a subnational share of general government 
expenditure lower than 30%. 
 
 Public order 
& Safety 
Education Health Social 
Security & 
Welfare 
Housing & 
Communal 
Amenities 
Recreation 
& Culture 
Transportation & 
Communication 
Average 
BULGARIA 2.17 59.53 44.11 8.30 68.95 26.69 12.19 31.70% 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
17.20 17.22 5.98 8.03 68.47 61.89 46.53 32.18% 
BULGARIA 6.86 46.99 44.83 11.99 74.10 43.97 27.64 36.62% 
POLAND 34.30 72.47 87.36 17.49 86.92 76.13 65.34 62.85% 
ROMANIA 4.80 9.23 0.36 2.97 83.01 34.74 17.55 21.80% 
SLOVAKIA 5.69 2.40 0.26 0.49 56.74 27.00 18.78 15.90% 
Table no. 1. The proportion of subnational share of general government expenditure (expressed as percentage from the total national budget).  
(Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, IMF, Washington, D.C., 2001. The data is selected only for the 
countries of East-Central Europe, former satellites of USSR.) 
Conclusively, (a) for the significant level of fiscal-administrative decentralization, the Polish case is exponential; 
(b) the standard level of decentralization fits the Czech and the Bulgarian cases, whereas (c) the low level of 
decentralization is specific to the Romanian case. Recent studies have shown the impact of decentralization 
formulae on the outlook and the role of local political elites. Such an empirical concern has been focused primarily 
on Latin America, South Asia (Beard, Miraftab, & Silver, 2008; Smoke, Gómez, & Peterson, 2006; Burki, Perry, & 
Dillinger, 1999; Escobar-Lemmon, 2003; Bardhan, 2002; Garman, Haggard, & Willis, 2001; Falleti, 2005 etc.), and 
Africa (Cottingham, 1970), while the topic has been generally neglected for the developing democracies of East-
Central Europe. Dora Orlansky (2000, p. 196) discusses the impact of decentralization upon the power-sharing 
between the central and the local administrative layers and upon the extent of political power and responsibility 
local elites are expected to exert. Discussing a series of examples from Africa and South Asia, Devarajan et al. 
(2009, p. 118-119) refer to the dangers of elite isolation with the increase in decentralized communities and to shifts 
in delivery of public services once with the process of decentralization. Quite interestingly, Merilee S. Grindle 
(2007, p. 63-105) introduces the example of decentralization in Mexico, concluding that proper fiscal and 
administrative decentralization can result in high levels of political competition and satisfaction with the living in 
the town, both at the level of the local elites and the community. It becomes apparent that local leadership modifies 
its outlook and prioritization strategy in the context of change of administrative organization leading to increased 
decentralization. Jonathan Rodden (2004) presents the impact of different forms of decentralization upon the city 
management, but, most importantly, upon the degree of elite isolation and passive representation. Finally, opposing 
two main approaches in reference to the impact of decentralization policies – the “liberal-individualist” and “statist” 
approaches –, Aylin Topal (2012) describes forms of elite isolation after the proper implementation of 
decentralization policies and differences of agenda setting of local elites as response to increased decentralization. 
The fashion in which the elites’ outlook, value orientation and strategy prioritization actually modifies is partially 
elaborated in the present paper, with a special focus on particular municipalities in four countries of East-Central 
Europe: Romania, Czech Republic, Poland, and Bulgaria.    
The levels of decentralization may impact the drafting of policy agenda at the local level, the strategy 
prioritization, the degree of elite isolation (i.e. the insistence on contacts and interactions confined to the governed 
municipality), some of the value-orientations, etc. Hence, it is expected that a significant level of decentralization 
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would exhibit an equally high degree of elite isolation and would induce an orientation towards the so-called “hard” 
spheres of activities (e.g. public improvements, infrastructure, economic development, public order, etc.), a 
considerable degree of political responsibility and responsiveness, and the identification with a rather “pragmatic” 
and “technocratic” elite profile. On the other hand, it might be easily hypothesized that low levels of 
decentralization can only result in a geographically open elite, in a focus on rather “soft” spheres of activity and a 
policy prioritization accordingly (e.g. education, healthcare, culture, youth and recreation activities, etc.), due to a 
perceived impotence of implementing change locally and a resulting low level of political responsibility, and the 
construction of an elite profile concentrated on “ethical” and “political” models. The second explanatory trajectory 
refers to the legacy of the ancien régime. In order to operationalize this complex variable, this study utilizes the 
differentiation operated by Kitschelt et al. (1999) between three types of communist dictatorship in the countries of 
former Sovietized Europe: (1) “national accommodative” communist dictatorship (e.g. Poland and Hungary), (2) 
“bureaucratic authoritarian” or “welfare” communist dictatorship (Jarausch, 1999) (e.g. Czechoslovakia and East 
Germany), and (3) “patrimonial” or “modernizing-nationalizing” communist dictatorship (Petrescu, 2010) (e.g. 
Romania and Bulgaria). 
Depending on the type of communist dictatorship faced by each of the four societies under scrutiny here, the elite 
developed a certain form of “political culture”‡, remnant features of which have been traduced, reproduced or 
preserved outright during the transition and the period of democratic consolidation. The study favors Jowitt’s 
collocation “elite political culture”§ (1992, pp. 51-52, and 54-56) to refer to those attitudinal and behavioral traits 
inherited from the ancien régime, conserved from the central to the local level. For instance, a former “patrimonial” 
regime would result in an increased monolithism of the new political elites, whereas a “bureaucratic-authoritarian” 
would produce a political elite who is technocratically-oriented. Finally, a “national-accommodative” former regime 
is prone to generate in contemporaneity an elite who is rather fragmented, factionalist, allowing for opposition, 
contestation and certain degree of “back-bencherism”, along with a pragmatic attitude in decision-making and 
profile identification. Moreover, a series of socio-demographical indicators in the elite profile construction are 
tempered by the nature of the former regime, as is the case, for instance, with the rate of ascendant social mobility, 
which is generally higher in previously “patrimonial” communist regimes, while decreasing in the case of formerly 
“bureaucratic-authoritarian” communist dictatorship, where there had existed a small group of “petite bourgeoisie”, 
rather an a large mass of peasants out of which democracy later selected its elites.   
 
 
‡ The definition and operationalization of “political culture” have resulted into an overwhelming diversity in understanding. R. Putnam refers 
to “elite political culture”, defined as some form of attitudinal and behavioral aggregates of the elite group, generally constant, hardly changeable, 
stable ones; the term accounts for “patterns of beliefs and attitudes [prevalent among the members of the political elite] about the economic, 
political, social, cultural systems” (Putnam, 1973). In applying the observations drawn from the usage of the concept “elite political culture”, one 
could only wonder if the four selected groups forming the Municipal Councils of Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, and Targovishte have acquired a 
sense of group consciousness as an elite; such an “elite consciousness” at the local level is difficult to be operationalized and subsequently 
measured, but some attemptive endeavors employ such indicators as the degree of group cohesion, the acknowledgement of some “special” (i.e. 
specific) traits a local councilor should possess (excepting, of course, the moral dimension which is by no means one of group or status 
differentiation in the case of elites). Actually, though rhetorically catchy and discursively fashionable, the ethical image of the political elite, in 
the sweet Aristotelian tradition, is an obsolete one, and its obsoleteness became conspicuous in the literature as early as the beginning of the 20th 
century, with the famous works of the Italian “elitists”, the trio Pareto – Mosca – Michels.  
§ “Elite political culture” is “a set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) postures that emerge as response to and consequence of a 
given elite’s identity-forming experiences”. Ken Jowitt (1992) defines “elite political culture” somehow in opposition to what he coins as “regime 
political culture” (i.e. “a set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) postures that emerge in response to the institutional definition of 
social, economic, and political life”) and “community political culture” (i.e. “a set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) postures that 
emerge in response to the historical relationships between regime and community”. For Jowitt, the said collocation is actually defined in terms of 
behavioral analysis of the ancien régime: the “political culture” is “the set of informal, adaptative postures – behavioral and attitudinal – that 
emerge in response to, and interact with, the set of formal definitions – ideological, policy and institutional – that characterize a given level of 
society.” 
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3. An application of the twofold variation: the ideal portrait of the local/ municipal councilor (quality-based 
profile) 
In order to exemplify the validity of the twofold explanatory trajectories in the outlook of the local political 
leaders in ECE – i.e. the impact of the level of decentralization and that of the “legacy” of the former communist 
regime –, the paper employs the examples of the municipal councilors in the four small-to-medium-sized towns used 
in the previous contribution to this volume (Tecuci in Romania, Česká Lípa in the Czech Republic, Oleśnica in 
Poland, and Targovishte in Bulgaria). Thus, apart from the value-based profile of the local political elites in the four 
towns selected (previously constructed on the general attitudes of the local leadership towards values of democracy, 
the state intervention in economy, the furthering of decentralization process, and the cultural-geographical self-
identification), a quality-based profile could be equally scrutinized with the assistance of the projections the local/ 
municipal councilors build about their public posture, and subsequently explained by the two explanatory 
trajectories presented above. Hence, the quality-based profile, regarding the (self-constructed) ideal portrait of the 
local/ municipal councilor, was formed after the gathering of the responses of the members of the four Municipal 
Councils to the open question: “What are the first five most important qualities a municipal councilor should possess 
?”. After comprehensively scrutinizing the ones in power, the recent scholarly generally agreed on five models 
(Prewitt, 1970) that might account for specific “qualities” in defining and identifying elites. The assemblage of these 
models pledges to the fact that a normative-descriptive reconciliation was intended, although in an overwhelmingly 
descriptive fashion**. The “ethical model” of political elite refers to such qualities as: correctness, honesty, fairness, 
altruism, modesty, high moral standards, verticality, courage, bravery. The “technocratic model” of political elite 
takes into consideration such attributes as: political experience, political will, expertise and training, intelligence, 
patience/ rapid reaction, enthusiasm and imagination. The “pragmatic model” of political elite is respective to such 
features as: dedication to the constituency’s (state’s) improvement plans, devotion and respect for the community/ 
country, desire to change, the capacity to identify development opportunities for the community/ country, vision, 
perspective, initiative, persuasion skills, capacity to compromise and negotiate, dialog-oriented, intuition, social 
sensitivity, care for the citizen, economic independence, leadership skills. The “political model” subscribes to the 
following qualities: oratorical skills, rhetoric, political loyalty, incorruptibility, interest detachment (objectivity), 
collegiality and team spirit. The “gender model” refers to the gender quality. Therefore, the answers received have 
been collected under five clusters of qualities – referred here as “models” –, founded on Prewitt’s fivefold quality 
model of political elites (1970). The quality-based profile is instrumental for both the value attainment of the elite 
and for such distant matters, such as the patterns of recruitment, degree of interaction with other groups and 
institutions, level of isolation towards the constituency or in respect to the central elite, the degree of accountability, 
responsiveness and the mechanisms of strategy prioritization, etc. As a consequence, after the collection of the 
answers, the following distribution was formed:   
x The ethical model (22.65%, for Tecuci; 28.68%, for Česká Lípa; 18.91%, for Oleśnica; 32.23%, for Targovishte); 
x The political model (23.98%; 12.93%; 4.05%; 32.23%); 
x The technocratic model (9.33%; 21.28%; 18.90%; 10.52%); 
x The pragmatic model (21.32%; 37%; 45.9%; 25%); 
x The gender model (0% for all cases).  
Identifying the qualities that ideally a local councilor should possess and the preference for a specific “model” 
(set of qualities) is arguably profoundly influenced and explicable by the two independent variables discussed here. 
It is significant to mention that the distribution of the qualities along the five models in each of the four cases is 
determined largely of various endogenous and exogenous factors, including, but not limited to: the socio-
demographical background of the respondents, the patterns of recruitment according to which they are (s)elected, 
 
 
** This is particularly the reason why this paper coins the recent (i.e. post-Wright-Mills) empirical drive in studying and defining political 
elites as “neo-descriptive”, since it admits the necessity of introducing the “ethical model”, in spite of the fact that the inquiries are in themselves 
largely descriptive, exploratory.  
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the interactions and contacts they establish and entertain, the degree of political-administrative decentralization, the 
“legacy of the former regime” and its nature, etc.    
 Tecuci  Česká 
Lípa  
Oleśnica  Targovi
shte  
Ethical model      
Correctness, honesty, fairness, truthfulness  14.66% 12.03% 12.16% 13.81% 
Altruism, selflessness   1.33%  4.05% 3.28% 
Modesty  1.33%  1.85%   3.94% 
High moral standards, verticality and seriousness, sobriety, personal discipline  5.33%  10.18%  2.7%  10.52% 
Courage, bravery   3.7%   0.65%  
Punctuality  0.92%    
Technocratic model      
Political experience, political will  5.33% 6.48%  4.60% 
Expertise and training  4%  4.62%  2.7%  2.63% 
Reliability    5.4%   
Effectiveness, competence    2.7%  1.97% 
Intelligence, wisdom   6.48%  4.05%  1.31%  
Patience or rapid reaction   1.85%    
Enthusiasm, imagination, creativity, innovation   1.85%  4.05%   
Pragmatic model      
Dedication to the town’s improvement plans, devotion, respect for the community, 
desire to change  
12% 8.33%  10.52% 
Involvement, diligence, commitment, assertiveness, industry   9.45%   
Determent, consistency, consequence    4.05%   
Thoroughness    1.35%   
The capacity to identify development opportunities for the town (vision, perspective)  6.66%  10.18% 1.35%  7.23% 
Initiative  1.33%  1.85%   1.97% 
Persuasion skills, capacity to compromise, cooperate and negotiate, dialog-oriented, non-
conflict  
1.33%  7.4%  8.1%  1.31% 
Intuition   0.92%    
Openness with others, tolerance, broadmindedness    9.45%   
Social sensitivity, social activity, care for the citizen   3.7%  9.45%   
Economic independence   1.85%   1.31% 
Leadership skills   2.77%   2.63%  
Accountability, responsiveness    2.7%  
Political model      
Oratorical skills  1.33%  0.92%  1.97% 
Political loyalty 2.66% 1.85%  7.23% 
Incorruptibility  5.33%  4.62%  1.35%  3.28% 
Interest detachment (objectivity)  2.66%  2.77%  1.35%  3.28% 
Collegiality, team spirit  12%  2.77%   16.44%  
Political independence    1.35%   
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Gender model  0%  0%  0%  0% 
Table no. 2. The features of the local leadership, according to the quality-based profile constructed by the local political elites themselves (Q16: 
“What are the first five most important qualities a municipal councilor should possess ?”) 
Monolithism (i.e. a highly homogeneous elite, cherishing party loyalty, political experience and collegiality, team 
spirit especially) and the predominance of a “political model” might be reminiscent of the elites of the former 
regime, while a “pragmatic model” and a fragmented, heterogeneous elite group would coincide to a tradition of 
circulating elites and technocratic petite bourgeoisie during the period of state socialism. Instead, nowadays, it is the 
“pragmatic model” of “organizational and personal commitments”, of efficiency and effective management, that 
surpasses the importance of the “political model” of party and ideological loyalty: though the influence of party 
affiliations and ideological affinities become crucial and even indispensable, they lose their importance in the face 
of the localized problems the small community confronts with; problem-solving, respect for the community, 
competence and the capacity to pinpoint development opportunities for the town are those features that take 
precedence when a group establishes itself as a local political elite. Together, all assets listed render the local 
councilor for political leadership more commendable than his peers who may lack them. With these differences in 
mind, if one is to conclude if a certain form of “democratic elitism” and an “elite consciousness” are at work in the 
four cases discussed, inductive reasoning seems to have fallen down to a certain extent. Indeed, one may reason that, 
largely, the members of the four Municipal Councils bear the incipient features of perceiving themselves as a quite 
distinct group of notables within their respective communities. However, the “elitist exercise” is far from being a 
constant in the leadership outlook of the four small communities, the local elites displaying a rather “popular” image 
of the leading ones. 
4. Concluding remarks and a tentative taxonomy 
The present study advances a threefold classification of local political leadership, constructed employing mainly 
two explanatory trajectories, one of the being discussed at some length here: (a) the level of administrative-fiscal 
decentralization specific for each of the countries under scrutiny, and (2) the “legacy” of the former communist 
regime, expressed through the type of “elite political culture” (Jowitt, 1999). Thusly, the study proposes and favors 
the differentiation among three types of elites, underpinned on the specific content of elite political culture and on 
the set of attributions provided by a certain degree of decentralization: 
x “Predominantly elitistic” (e.g. Tecuci and Targovishte), corresponding to a former “modernizing-nationalizing”, 
“patrimonial” communist dictatorship, followed by “elite reproduction”, and low levels of administrative 
decentralization and local autonomy, presently; characterized by a significant degree of “elite distinctiveness”; 
x “Democratic elitist” (e.g. Česká Lípa), corresponding to a defunct “national-accommodative” communist 
dictatorship, followed by “elite circulation”, and high levels of decentralization and local autonomy, in the 
present; 
x “Predominantly democratic” (e.g. Oleśnica), corresponding to a former “bureaucratic-authoritarian”, “welfare” 
communist dictatorship, followed by “elite circulation”, a tradition of administrative decentralization, and 
significant levels of local autonomy, nowadays.  
“Predominantly elitistic” are those elites characterized by a significant degree of “elite distinctiveness”, i.e. 
perceiving themselves, as a group or individually, as separate from the bulk of the town’s population, as part of a 
special, superior caste of notables and local potentates, hence prone to favor the clear gap between the rulers and the 
ruled; enjoying considerable levels of prestige and reputation, this type of local elites display however a sense of 
reluctance in effectively dealing with the community’s main problems, on the basis that power at the local level is 
insufficient to allow the leadership here to implement change. Therefore, it might be concluded that the 
“predominately elitist” local leadership corresponds to those communities presenting low degrees of decentralization 
and local autonomy. Additionally, the “predominantly elitistic” local elites are tightly linked to a “political” model, 
for their recruitment is almost exclusively intramural, all those comprising the local leadership being party members 
and benefiting from the otherwise indispensable support of the party, whose local branches are highly dependent of 
the central one. Interestingly, the “predominantly elitistic” groups are those that most closely approximate the 
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Aristotelian desideratum in their construction, conception and self-perception: they tend to adhere to an “ethical” 
model of the ideal local councilor, at least declaratively cherishing moral attributes that would provide them with 
some sort of moral superiority as prime marks of distinctiveness in respect to their constituency, to the population of 
their community.      
“Democratic elitist” are those elites whose traits and profiles point to some form of aurea mediocritas between a 
sense of distinctiveness and the prestige they enjoy within the community, on the one hand, and the effective and 
meaningful dedication to their community’s developmental plans, on the other hand; as such, though they form a 
“caste” of notables within the town and are hardly representative to the population of the establishments they lead, 
in socio-demographical terms, they can act decisively for the benefit of their town due to a considerable degree of 
local autonomy and decentralized prerogatives, responsibilities and attributions. The local councilors of the 
“democratic elitist” sort remain still largely dependent on the support of the political parties, but the local parties 
appear independent in respect to their central branch; occasionally, “democratic elitist” type corresponds to 
intramural recruitment of locally-established parties, splinters or other quite localized political movements and 
organizations, responding to extremely specific needs and demands or describing relatively strong political localism 
and allowing for factionalism and decentralized, territorialized “back-bencher”-ism. In addition, the “democratic 
elitist” groups overlaps on a rather “pragmatic” or “technocratic” model of the local councilor, as the most cherished 
attributes of the leadership come to be the professionalism of the local leadership, its capacity in decision-making, 
policy designing and problem-solving. 
“Predominantly democratic” are those elites featuring a sense of identification with the masses, with the ordinary 
citizens of the community they happen to represent temporarily, a dominating “social sensitivity” that would 
determine their propensity towards social security and welfare strategies in local leadership; this type of local elites 
are juxtaposed to a tradition of decentralization and devolution mechanisms that permit them to identify and to 
implement policies responding to the needs of the town. The “predominantly democratic” type of local elites is 
probably the closest to the population it represents in terms of passive representation, for it may include persons of 
lower education, or people previously involved in directly advocating for the interests of some segments in the 
community (pupils, women, unemployed, workers, etc.). These local leaders are usually quite familiar to the 
problems their town confronts with, being especially concerned with social issues (e.g. unemployment, social 
benefits, housing, etc.). The methods of recruiting elites in this context are highly inclusive, but the actual specificity 
of these elites is the extramural fashion in which they are selected, as their political affiliation is futile if existent; the 
role of the party in the recruitment process, either local or central branches, is virtually insignificant. Consequently, 
the “predominantly democratic” local elites correspond to rather “pragmatic” and “moral” profiles, while the 
“political” model is virtually absent in their case. 
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